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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD GERALD DYE, aka 
R. GERALD DYE, and GAS 
PRODUCING ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiffs - Respondents, 
-vs-
MILLER & VIELE, a corporation, 
LEE CHARLES MILLER, LESLEY 
F. LEWIS, and CHEVRON OIL 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants - Appellant, 
and 
All Other Persons Unknown 
Claiming Any Right, Title, 
Estate, Lien or Interest in 
the Real Property Described 
in the Complaint Adverse to 
Plaintiffs' Ownership, or any 
Cloud upon Plaintiffs' Title 
Thereto. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 15475 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title to an undivided one-
half mineral interest. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The district court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment finding Plaintiff Dye to be the owner of the undivided 
one-half mineral interest. Defendant Miller & Viele's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was denied. The court held that Defendant 
Miller & Viele was barred by the applicable statutes of limita-
tion for tax titles from interposing defenses to Plaintiff Dye': 
tax title to the disputed one-half mineral interest. The distri 
court denied that portion of Plaintiffs' Motion pertaining to 
perfection of Plaintiff Dye's title by adverse possession. 
Judgment was entered quieting title to the disputed one-half 
mineral interest i~ Plaintiff Dye. The court further ordered 
Defendant Chevron Oil Company (now Chevron USA, Inc.) to disburs 
to Plaintiffs accrued and future shares of oil and gas produc-
tion attributable to the disputed one-half mineral interest. 
There are no disputed issues of fact. All relevant 
facts pertaining to the chains of title and lack of possession 
by Defendant Miller & Viele were either admitted in the pleadin~ 
or stipulated and agreed to by the parties. All facts pertainir 
to possession by Plaintiffs or their predecessors and the 
Payment of Taxes were submitted upon affidavit and certified 
abstract. Only issues of law were decided by the Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek affirmance of the ruling below. 
-2-
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND 
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Miller & Viele, a defendant and the appellant, here-
inafter will be referred to as Miller & Viele. Defendant 
Chevron Oil Company hereinafter will be referred to as 
Chevron or, where appropriate, by its full name. Richard 
Gerald Dye, a plaintiff and respondent, hereinafter will 
be referred to as Dye or, where appropriate, by his full 
name. Plaintiff and respondent Gas Producing Enterprises, 
Inc., hereinafter will be referred to by its complete 
name. Richard Gerald Dye and Gas Producing Enterprises, 
Inc., collectively, hereinafter will be referred to as 
plaintiffs or, where appropriate, by their names. 
"R" refers to a page reference in the record of the 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in defendant's brief 
(pp. 3-7) is accurate so far as it goes. However, defendant 
omits certain pertinent facts essential to a full and accurate 
statement, and therefore plaintiffs present this additional 
statement. 
It is true that Richard Gerald Dye is a record owner of 
the undivided one-half interest in minerals underlying the 
forty acres legally described as the NW~NE~ of Section 29 
in Township 1 South, Range l West, USM, located in Duchesne 
County, Utah. 
-3-
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Dye's title to the undivided one-half interest in minerals 
underlying the forty acres in dispute sterns directly from the 
Auditor's Tax Deed issued to Duchesne County on May 9, 1932 
(R-231, 300). On December 21, 1927, the NW\NE~ (including all 
minerals) had been sold to Duchesne County for delinquent gener 
property taxes assessed and levied for tax year 1927 (R-230, 29 
These lands were not redeemed from tax sale by the "legal owner i 
by any other person or party holding an interest therein during 
statutory four year period for redemptions of lands f rorn tax sa 
(R-230, 231). The lands were then "struck-off" (sold) to Due~ 
County at the 1932 May Sale, at which time the Auditor's Tax~ 
issued (R-231). The surface of the NW~NE\ and the undivided on 
interest in minerals here in dispute was ultimately conveyed 
to Dye in 1954 (R-232, 371). 
Dye and his predecessors in interest have been in actual 
possession and occupancy of the NW\NE~ since 1954 and have 
paid all real property taxes levied and assessed against 
the property since 1936 (R-232,233). The remaining undivided 
one-half interest in minerals is owned by one of Dye's prede-
cessors in interest and is not in dispute here (R-232, 345). 
It is true that Miller & Viele claims an interest in 
the disputed undivided one-half interest in minerals. Miller & 
Viele's claim sterns from a 1928 mortgage foreclosure and 
execution sale in favor of defendant Lee Charles Miller of the 
NW\NE~ which was already subject to the 1927 preliminary tax 
sale to Duchesne County (R-230, 296). Through a series of Conv 
-4-
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v 
the interest obtained by defendant Lee Charles Miller pursuant 
to the foreclosure proceeding devolved upon Miller & Viele in 
1930 (R-231, 298), still subject to the 1927 preliminary tax sale 
to Duchesne County. In 1946 Miller & Viele quitclaimed the 
NW~NE~ to one of Dye's predecessor's in interest, purporting to 
reserve to itself the undivided one-half interest in minerals 
now in dispute (R-233, 337). 
At the time Miller & Viele received its deed to the NW\NE\, 
it was, and now still is a Utah Corporation engaged in the 
business of real estate investment and mortgage banking (R-230). 
Neither Miller & Viele, nor any of its predecessors in interest 
redeemed the NW\NE\ from tax sale during the statutory four year 
period for redemption (R-231) . At no time during the forty-seven 
years since receiving its deed from its predecessor did Miller & 
Viele go into actual possession or actual occupancy of the 
NW~NE~ (R-233). At no time during the forty-seven years 
since receiving its deed from its predecessor did Miller & Viele 
pay the general property taxes levied and assessed against the 
NW~NE\ (R-233). 
In sununary, the facts of this case developed two independant 
record chains of title; one in plaintiff Dye stemming from the 
tax sale proceedings, the other in defendant Miller & Viele 
through the mortgage foreclosure proceeding. These chains of 
title are illustrated for convenience on page 1 of the Appendix 
to this brief. The ultimate question presented is whether Miller 
& Viele is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation from 
asserting its chain of title. 
-5-
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Plaintiffs take no exception to Miller & Viele's Statement 
of Facts pertaining to creation of the oil and gas leasehold 
estates, the Cornrnunitization Agreement, formation of the 640 
acre drilling and spacing unit, and completion and operation 
of the R. G. Dye l-29Al Well in the SW~NW~SE~ of Section 29. 
Plaintiffs do add, however, that defendant Chevron Oil Company 
did not physically enter upon the NW~NE~ during its exploration 
drilling and production operation (R-156 to 183) . 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
DEFENDANT MILLER & VIELE IS BARRED BY THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIG 
FOR TAX TITLES FROM INTERPOSING ANY DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF RICHAR 
GERALD DYE'S TAX TITLE TO THE NW~NE~ INCLUDING THE UNDIVIDED ON 
HALF MINERAL INTEREST IN SAID LANDS ON GROUNDS THAT SAID DEFENS 
IS INTERPOSED MORE THAN FOUR YEARS SUBSEQUENT TO ISSUANCE OF Tli 
TAX TITLE AND DEFENDANT MILLER & VIELE OR ITS AGENTS HAVE NOT 
ACTUALLY OCCUPIED OR BEEN IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE LANDS WIT 
FOUR YEARS PRIOR TO INTERPOSITION OF ITS DEFENSE PURSUANT TO UT 
CODE ANN. §§78-12-5.l and -.2 (1953). 
Although judicial decision appears to entitle Miller & Vie 
to have the facts viewed in a light most favorable to it inas-
much as this is an appeal from a Summary Judgment, it must be 
noted that all facts pertaining to the respective chains of tit 
-6-
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were stipulated to by the parties to this appeal. All facts 
pertaining to actual possession of the NW\NE\ and to payment 
of taxes by Dye and his predecessors in interest, as well as 
to exploration and production activities of Chevron Oil 
Company were submitted by both parties to the appeal upon 
affidavit and certified abstract and are uncontroverted. 
Both plaintiffs and defendant Miller & Viele moved the 
lower court for summary judgment on grounds that there were 
no material issues of fact. With the sole exception of the 
Driscoll affidavit pertaining to the perimeters of the 
"common source of supply", which the lower court refused to 
accept, all facts were before the court. There was no new 
or additional evidence which could have been presented to 
the court even in a trial setting. The district court 
considered all the evidence and every inference fairly to be 
derived therefrom, and ruled in plaintiffs' favor. This 
case was a particularly appropriate case for summary judgment 
as there were no disputed facts. The only issues in the 
district court were issues of law. They are now on appeal. 
The issue for determination is whether or not Miller & 
Viele is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation 
from interposing its defenses to Dye's tax title. This 
issue in turn raises the real question to be determined 
whether Miller & Viele was in actual possession of the 
disputed mineral interest within four years prior to the 
interposition of its defense in this lawsuit to Dye's 
tax title. 
-7-
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The district court's decision was based upon §§78-12-5.1 an 
78-12-5.2, the statutes which prescribe the period of limitation 
applicable in tax title litigation. Miller & Viele's position a 
appeal is that it fits the actual possession exception of those 
statutes and therefore is not barred from asserting its defense 
to Dye's title. 
Specifically, Miller & Viele contends that it was in posse~ 
of the undivided one-half mineral interest underlying the NW\NE~ 
by and through its oil and gas lessee, Chevron Oil Company, with 
the four year period prior to interposition of Miller & Viele's 
defense to Dye's tax title. The facts upon which Miller & Viele 
seeks to support its contention are that Chevron is operator of 
the R. G. Dye l-29Al Well which produces oil and gas from a comm 
source of supply underlying the drilling unit into which the Dye 
lease was pooled. The well operated by Chevron is located in tb 
SW\NW\SE\ of the Section 29 drilling unit on a lease other than 
Dye lease. Miller & Viele concludes that production of oil and 
from the well-head somehow constitutes actual possession of the 
undivided one-half mineral interest in the NW\NE\. 
However, the cases relied upon by Miller & Viele to support 
its position that possession of the lessee inures to the benefit 
of the lessor are ancient landlord-tenant and mortgagee-mortgago 
cases from foreign jurisdictions which are not controlling upon 
this Court. Furthermore, those oil and gas cases cited by Miller 
Viele in its brief do not stand for the proposition asserted by 
Miller & Viele; that production of oil and gas from lands pooled 
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into a drilling unit consitutes "actual" possession of the mineral 
estates in those lands. In fact the law of those cases is to the 
1: contrary, and is directly supportive of plaintiffs' position. 
Plaintiffs contend, that based upon the statutes and 
compelling oil and gas case law, Chevron was not in actual possession 
or actual occupancy of the NW~NE~, including the underlying mineral 
;: estate, required by the applicable statutes of limitation. There-
., fore, Miller & Viele is barred from challenging Dye's tax title. 
e The Utah statutes of limitation for tax titles bar all 
challenges to tax titles which are not brought within four years 
m of the date of issuance of the tax title. Peterson v. Callister, 
·e 6 Utah 2d 359, 313 P.2d 814 (1957); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310, 
:h1 283 P. 2d 884 (1955). There are two exceptions to the barring of 
untimely defenses, limited (1) to persons challenging the tax title 
who have actually occupied or who have been in actual possession of 
the lands affected by the tax title; and (2) to cities or towns who 
hold a lien which is equal or superior to the claim of the tax 
rt title holder. 
it Miller & Viele relies on the possession exception which 
go reads in context as follows: 
n 
er 
.ed 
. no such action or defense shall be commenced or 
interposed more than four years after the date of the 
tax deed . . . unless the person commencing or inter-
posing such action or defense . . . has actually 
occupied or been in possession of such.propert~ ~ith­
in fours prior to the commencement or interposition 
of such action or defense . . . (emphasis added) 
§78-12-5.1 
-9-
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The companion proviso reads as follows: 
. this section shall not bar any action or 
defense by the owner of legal title to such prop-
erty where he . . has actually occupied or been 
in actual possession of such property within four 
years from the commencement or interposition of 
such action or defense . (emphasis added) 
§78-12-5.2 
Although this exception has been formerly recognized by the Utai 
Supreme Court in Huntington City v. Peterson, 30 Utah 2d 408, s: 
P.2d 1246 (1974), the court has given no indication that the "~ 
possession" exception in the statutes was anything other than 
actual possession. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "actual possession" of 
real property interests as follows: 
"Actual possession exists where the thing (real 
property) is in the immediate occupancy of the 
party;" B.L. Diet p. 349; or as the court in this 
case instructed the jury, "Actual possession is 
the subjugation of the premises to the use and 
dominion of the claimant." [Lillianskyoldt v. 
Goss, 2 Utah 297 (1877) ]. 
That case involved an action to recover an undivided interest 
in real property. 
The Utah position is in accord with other jurisdictions whc 
have defined the term similarly when construing similar types of 
statutes. In People ex rel Turner v. Kelsey, 89 NYS 416, 418, 
96 App. Div. 148 (1904), the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
Division, in construing a real property tax statute which requir 
a party to be in "actual possession" prerequisite to redeeming 
delinquent property from tax sale, said: 
"'Actual possession,' is a legal phrase, is 
put in opposition to the other phrase, 'possession 
in law,' or 'constructive possession.' Actual 
-10-
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3.i 
s: 
le 
1( 
possession is the same as pedis possessio or pedis 
positio, and these mean a foothold on the land, an 
actual entry, a possession in fact, a standing upon 
it, an occupation of it, as a real, demonstrative 
act done. It is the contrary of a possession in 
law, which follows in the wake of title." 
The Utah adverse possession statutes countained in §§78-12-9 
and §78-12-11 are helpful in defining what types of acts constitute 
"actual possession" of land. Under those statutes a person is 
considered to have occupied or possessed lands where the person 
(1) cultivates or improves the land; or (2) protects the land by 
a substantial inclosure; or (3) uses the land for fuel, timber, 
pasturage, or other ordinary use of the land; or (4) expends the 
value of $5.00 per acre in labor or money to erect or maintain 
irrigation works. The acts expressly stated in those statutes 
as constituting actual possession, and those acts to be implied 
therefrom, are all acts requiring pedis possessio, or actual 
entry upon and immediate occupation of the land claimed to be 
possessed. Further, those acts enumerated in the statutes are 
designed to give the true owner of the property notice that some-
one else is asserting physical possession of the land. 
The requirement for pedis possessio or a foothold upon the 
Jf 
estate does not change when this court has dealt with possession 
of the mineral estate. This court has held that there is no 
actual possession of the severed mineral estate where there 
tr 
is no actual possession of the beds through mining and extraction. 
Kanawha and Hocking Coal and Coke Company v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d 
1139, 1140 (Utah 1975). In that case this Court rigidly applied 
the statutes of limitation for tax titles in a mineral dispute 
-11-
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to bar the plaintiff from challenging defendant Carbon Count 
tax title to the coal beds. The coal beds, which had been 
assessed separately from the surface, had been sold to Carbor 
County for unpaid taxes for the year 1932. The auditor's ta; 
deed issued to Carbon County in 1937. Plaintiff occupied anc 
possessed the surface, but also asserted ownership of the rob 
which had been severed from the surf ace by the tax sale befoi 
plaintiff's period of possession commenced. The Court held' 
the plaintiff was barred by §78-12-5.1 from challenging Carb 
County's tax title since the county had received its tax deec 
more than four years prior to the suit, and since the plainti 
had not been in actual possession of the mineral rights conve 
to the county by the tax deed within the four year period 
prior to the suit. Interestingly, the issues in Kanawha and 
Hocking Coal Company were before the lower court on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
The instant case does not deal with a severed mineral e: 
as did Kanawha. In this case the undivided one-half mineral 
interest has never been severed from the surface estate obtai 
by Duchesne County at tax sale. In other words the entire ~ 
simple estate in the NW\NE\ remains intact with the title to 
the surface and the disputed undivided one-half interest in r 
reposing in the same owner, Richard Gerald Dye, under the tai 
Miller & Viele admitted in its Answers to Interrogatorie 
that it was never in actual occupancy or actual pnssession o! 
NW\NE\ which includes the unsevered and undivided one-half m: 
interest, and the district court so found. As operator of tr 
-12-
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R. G. Dye l-29Al Well, Chevron Oil Company likewise has not been 
in actual, physical possession of either the NW\NE\ of Section 29, 
or the underlying mineral estate. The R. G. Dye l-29Al Well was 
drilled by and is now operated by Chevron in the SW\NW\SE\ of 
Section 29. The records of the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining 
submitted by Miller & Viele clearly reflect that Chevron's drilling 
and production activities as operator were confirmed solely to the 
well-site. Chevron has been in actual possession and occupancy 
of the lands covered by the lease upon which the well is located, 
but has not drilled or produced from a well on the NW\NE\. Since 
the well is not a directional well, slant drilled from the 
SW\NW\SE\ into the mineral estate underlying NW\NE~, Chevron 
has not been in actual physical possession of the mineral estate 
underlying the NW\NE\ owned by Dye as holder of the tax title, as 
Chevron had no foothold upon the mineral estate. 
The question then becomes two-pronged. First, did Chevron, 
as operator of the voluntary pooling unit located on Section 29 
to which the Dye lease was commi•ted somehow obtain actual 
possession of the undivided mineral interest by production of 
oil and gas from a common source of supply by means of a well 
located elsewhere in the unit on lands other than those covered 
by the Dye lease. Second, if it is determined that Chevron 
was in actual possession of the mineral interest underlying the 
NW~NE~, does that actual possession inure to Miller & Viele. 
Miller & Viele states in its brief that other courts ruling 
on this issue have held that well drilling operations on pooled 
lands are operations for the extraction of minerals from each 
of the pooled properties as if by their respective mineral inter-
est leaseholders (Brief of Appellant at 15). Miller & Viele 
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then cites Everts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Dixon v. American 
Liberty Oil Company, and Smith v. Holt, as well as provisions c 
the Communitization Agreement and Utah statutes pertaining to 
forced and voluntary pooling in an effort to support the propo· 
sition. Unique in this approach is the fact that the Dixon ca~ 
is one of the very cases urged by plaintiff below and which 
the district court found so convincing in ruling in plaintiffs' 
favor. Through misconstruing the whole thrust and purpose of 
those cases, the provisions of the Communitization Agreement ar 
the voluntary and forced pooling statute Miller & Viele has 
inadvertently marched into plaintiffs' camp waving plaintiffs' 
flag. 
The persuasive rule in oil and gas producing jurisdictiom 
is that removal of oil and gas from under a tract of land by ru 
of a well located on adjacent or nearby tracts, even it inclu& 
in the same production unit, is insufficient to constitue actui 
possession of the mineral estate. R. Hemingway, The Law of Oii 
and Gas 124 (1971) [hereinafter as Hemingway]. Professor Hemin1 
stated the foregoing rule under the subparagraph entitled "(Al 
of Actual Possession" within a context of his discussion of ad1 
possession of minerals. 
Meeting this issue head on in the very case Miller & VieL 
cites in support of its argument for actual possession, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated: 
[W]here as the drilling ~nd production of oil from 
a unitized area constitutes an exercise and user 
of mineral rights throughout the entire unit and 
operates as a substitute for oerformance of drilling 
obligations contained in a mineral lease, these acts 
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are not to be regarded as an eviction of the surface 
owner's possession of the minerals or of his exclusive 
right thereto when explorations are not conducted on 
the land itself. Dixon v. American Liberty Oil Company, 
77 So.2d 533, 538, 4 O&GR 21,23 (1954). 
In that case two adjacent tracts were unitized by order of the 
Department of Conservation. A well located on one tract drained 
the common pool located under both tracts. Although this was 
' an adverse possession case, it did not turn on the hostile, 
exclusive, continuous, or open elements of adverse possession. 
r It did turn on the actual possession element. The court reasoned 
that the mineral estate could not be thought of as separate from 
the surface estate, since both estates were owned by the same 
party and had not been severed. Consequently, since the minerals 
11 were not disturbed in place, that is from actual dominion of the 
ie land itself by oil and gas operations extracting directly from 
!i the land, the operator exercised no physical dominion over the 
Ii mineral estate by simply draining the pool. 
Li The reasoning in the Dixon case is consistent with the Utah 
11 theory of ownership of oil and gas in place. That theory encap-
sulates the notion that oil and gas is a corporeal estate in 
ji real property to be owned as part of the land, similar to owner-
ship of hard minerals. Chase v. Morgan, 9 Utah 2d 125, 339 P.2d 
i, 1019, 1021 (1959). The Utah rule aligns itself with the majority 
position in the country and is juxtaposed to the non-ownership in 
place concept which postulates that analogous to wild animals and 
water, oil and gas as a fugacious substance cannot be thought of 
as being in the possession of a party until reduced to actual 
possession at the well-head. Hemingway at 10. 
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In Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Candelaria, 
403 F.2d 351, 355 31 O&GR 215 (10th Cir. 1968), on facts 
strikingly similar to those at issue here, the court affirmed 
district holding that the unit operator and developer who cla~ 
adverse possession of oil and gas underlying lands covered by a 
lease committed to a voluntary unit did not effect actual poss€ 
where the well was not physically located on the lease, althoug 
the well might have drained the lands covered by the lease. In 
that case the unit operator, Pan American, was also the lessee 
of an unnamed co-defendant who was not in physical possession o 
but asserted rights to oil and gas in lands owned by plaintiffs 
This case did not turn on the elements of notice ~r hostility, 
but rather on lack of actual possession. Although the facts an 
commentary are scanty in the reported case, they are amply set 
forth in photocopies of the Findings of Fact (Nos. 10-19) which 
are attached hereto commencing at page 3 of the Appendix. 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit in deciding a case which arose 
in Utah stated that unitization and pooling agreements were 
no more than contracts between lessees with respect to alloca-
tion of production and computation of royalties, and did not 
vest in the parties to such agreements property rights, possess 
or otherwise. Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 
934 (10th Cir. 1954). For a discussion of this principle and 
the importance of Phillips Petroleum Company as the leading ca: 
see R. Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization, Vol. I, §13.~ 
at 439 (1967). The Phillips Petroleum Company case involved 
questions arising from unitizing leases on Duchesne County Lan< 
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to form the Roosevelt Unit. Consequently Miller & Viele's 
position is not supported by the case law. 
Counsel for Miller & Viele also cited Paragraph 8 of the 
Cornrnunitization Agreement and Utah Code Ann. §40-6-6 (f) as putting 
Chevron in possession of the mineral interest in and underlying 
the NW~NE~ by virtue of its operation of the R. G. Dye l-29Al Well. 
(Brief of Appellants at 18-20). Paragraph 8 of the Cornrnunitization 
Agreement reads as follows: 
8. 
The commencement, completion, continued operation 
or production of a well or wells for cornrnunitized 
substances on the cornrnunitized area shall be construed 
and considered as the commencement, completion, continued 
operation or production on each and all of the lands 
within and comprising said communitized area, and 
operations or production pursuant to this agreement 
shall be deemed to be operations or production as 
to each lease committed hereto. (emphasis added) 
The Cornrnunitization Agreement was executed on October 30, 1973, 
by defendant Chevron and plaintiff Gas Producing Enterprises, 
Inc., and by Gulf Oil Corporation and Shell Oil Company who are 
not parties to this suit. 
The pertinent provisions of §40-6-6 (f), read as follows: 
(f) When two or more separately owned tracts 
are braced within a drilling unit, or when there are 
separately owned interests in all or a part of the 
drilling unit, then persons owning such interests 
may pool their interests for the development and 
operation of the drilling unit. In the absence of 
voluntary pooling, the Commission, upon the application 
of any person with an interest in the proposed pool-
ing, may enter an order pooling all interests in the 
drilling unit for the development and operation thereof 
Operations incident to the drilling of a well upon any 
portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall 
be deemed for all purposes to be the conduct.of such 
operations upon each separately owned tract in the 
unit by the several owners thereof ... (emphasis added) 
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Counsel for Miller & Viele misconstrues Paragraph 8 of ti 
Comrnunitiz~tion Agreement and the statute. First, those porti 
of §40-6-6 (f) urged by counsel and underlined above pertain 
cnly to units covered by a compulsory (or forced) pooling 
order. Such pooling orders are issued by the Corrunission in t}. 
absence of voluntary pooling by the lessees. In this case, tr. 
Commission has established 640 acre spacing and drilling units 
provided by §40-6-6(a-e), but has not issued a pooling order, 
since all parties voluntarily pooled their leases for producti 
by execution of the Corrununitization Agreement. Consequently, 
the sub-section (f) language urged by Miller & Viele does not 
apply to the Section 29 drilling unit. 
Second, even if §40-6-6 (f) did apply to the unit, the 
language which states that drilling anywhere on the unit "shal 
be deemed for all purposes to be" drilling on each lease in tl 
unit is language of construction. The only species of possess 
in which sub-section (f) or Paragraph 8 of the Corrununitizatior 
Agreement could bestow upon a driller not in actual possessim 
is "constructive operation or constructive possession." How~ 
the statutes of limitation for tax titles expressly state that 
the party challenging a tax title must be in actual possessio1 
or actual occupancy. Constructive operations or constructive 
possession was not considered by the legislature as qualifyin1 
one to challenge a tax title when these limiting statutes wer 
enacted. 
Third, oil and gas leases on private lands are issued fo 
primary terms, generally of ten years and for so long thereaf 
as oil and gas is produced from the lease. Customarily, thes 
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leases provide for pooling and extension of the leases beyond 
the primary terms where production is had in the pooling unit 
but not on the lease. Paragraph 8 of the Communitization 
Agreement and sub-section (f) of the pooling statute are responsive 
to the contractual language contained in the leases. The 
constructive operations or constructive possession language is 
' designed specifically to hold all leases committed to the drilling 
unit beyond their primary terms by production from the well drilled 
anywhere on the unit. H. Williams & C. Meyers, VI Oil and Gas 
Law, §953 at 708.1-716.l (1977). [hereinafter cited as Williams 
and Meyers] . 
In their discussion of the effect of unitization statutes on 
~ the extension provisions of oil and gas leases, Professors 
:t. Williams and Meyers quote the Mississippi forced pooling statute, 
;s which is similar in language to Utah's §40-6-6 ( f) . That statute 
x reads as follows: 
Jr. 
at 
or. 
e 
The portion of unit production allocated to a 
separately owned tract within the unit area shall be 
deemed, for all purposes, to have been actually pro-
duced from such tract, and operations with respect to 
any tract within the unit area shall be deemed for all 
purposes to be the conduct of operations for the pro-
duction of oil or gas, or both, from each separately 
owned tract in the unit area. Miss Code Ann §6132-
106 quoted in Williams and Meyers at 708.5-708.6. 
ncconstruing the meaning of the foregoing statute and language 
re similar to Paragraph 8 of the Communitization Agreement, the 
authors conclude: 
or Everybody agrees that the standard language 
appearing in voluntary agreements and in 
.f some statutes - the language of the first 
sentence of Section 106 - should be taken 
·S' to mean . . that the lease will be preserved. 
(emphasis added) Williams and Meyers at 708.7 
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Finally, language from the Dixon case quoted by both plaint 
and defendants demonstrates the preservation aspect of the const 
tive language of such statutes and voluntary agreements. That 
language is again set forth as follows: 
[W]here as the drilling and production of oil from a 
unitized area constitutes an exercise and user of mineral 
rights throughout the entire unit and operates as a 
substitute for performance of drilling obligations 
contained in a mineral lease, these acts are not to be 
regarded as an eviction of the . . owner's possession 
of the mineral or of his exclusive right thereto when 
explorations are not conducted on the land itself. 
Dixon, 77 So2d at 538, 4 O&GR at 23. 
This language tracks the provisions of Paragraph 8 of the 
Cornmunitization Agreement and sub-section (f) of the statute. 
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly concluded that 
drilling on one lease in the voluntary pooling unit was a 
substitute for performance of drilling obligations on all other 
leases, the court determined that such drilling did not put the 
operator into actual possession of those leases not actually dri 
upon. This clearly shows that the type of language contained in 
Paragraph 8 of the Cornmunitization Agreement and §40-6-6(f) is 
designed as a substitute for performance, and not to create 
either actual or constructive possession. 
In both the Everts v. Phillips Petroleum Company, and 
Smith v. Holt cases cited respectively at pages 15 and 17 of 
Miller & Viele's brief, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that 
drilling on one lease in the unit constituted drilling on other 
lands within the unit. In Everts, the question was whether or 
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not failure to drill an off-set well activated a 1~% royalty 
provision designed to prevent drainage of the leased lands 
from oil wells on adjacent lands. The court ruled that 
compulsory pooling abrogated the 1~% royalty penalty provision 
as production and drilling on one lease in the unit was effective 
as though the well were actually drilled on the lease itself. 
In Smith, plaintiff had taken assignment of an undivided interest 
in mineral underlying twenty acres, already subject to an existing 
oil and gas lease which covered the twenty acres and the adjacent 
twenty. The forty acres were affected by a forty acre spacing 
order. Plaintiff argued that since the well was not drilled on 
his twenty acres that the oil and gas lessee could not claim an 
interest in the minerals. The court held that defendants' lessee 
was owner under lease of the oil and gas in all forty acres since 
the lease preceded the assignment to plaintiff. Consequently, 
in Everts, possession was not an issue and the operator was not 
i construed to have possessory rights in the mineral estate. In 
n Smith neither the facts nor the law apply since both interests 
in dispute were covered by one lease. 
Therefore, the legislative policy of §40-6-6(f), the 
intention of the parties in drafting Paragraph 8 into the 
Comrnunitization Agreement, and the clear and obvious meaning 
ascribed by oil and gas jurisdictions to such language is that 
the language provides a substitute for drilling obligation under 
r the individual leases in a pool and is designed to hold all leases 
within the unit beyond their stated primary terms by production 
on any one of the pooled leases. 
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There are also compelling policy considerations why Chevror. 
should not be considered to be in possession of the undivided 
one-half mineral interest in the NW\NE\. First, regardless of 
how one categorises the nature of Chevron's possession of the 
oil and gas at the well-head, whether actual or constructive, 
Chevron Oil Company is in possession of the substances in its 
capacity as operator of the unit, not as Miller & Viele's lessee 
As operator, Chevron is no more the agent of Miller & Viele tha:. 
it is of Dye and Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc. Chevron's 
agency as operator under the Communitiza~ion Agreement must be 
thought of as separate and distinct from its agency as Miller & 
Viele's lessee. Otherwise, possession would inure to Miller & 
Viele fortuitously, simply because Chevron, who just so happenec 
to be Miller & Viele's lessee, was elected by the other lessees 
to be the unit operator. 
Second, the statutes of limitations for tax titles are 
statutes of repose. Speaking to this issue in Peterson, supra, 
this Court stated that §78-12-5.1 is 
a statute of repose, obviously intended to 
lay to rest claims against tax titles which are 
asserted more than four years after acquisition 
of a tax title under statutory proceedings, and 
where the record owner has not had possession. 
Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d at 361, 313 P.2d 
at 815. 
To say now that Miller & Viele is in possession pursuant to the 
statute by the fortuitous fluke of circumstances in which 
Chevron as Miller & viele's lessee is also operator of the unit 
would be to totally frustrate the purpose of the statutes of re: 
Miller & Viele would then be afforded the opportunity to challe: 
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the validity of the tax title forty six years after creation of 
the title, when the facts surrounding the statutory proceeding are 
stale and the persons responsible for complying with the statutory 
steps are deceased, removed to other jurisdictions, or are dimmed 
in their memory of the events. All the evidentiary specters 
which the statutes are designed to dispell will now be mustered 
to roll. Surely, the legislature could not have intended such 
dispossessed, delinquent property owners as Miller & Viele to be 
in possession under such a fluke of circumstances. 
Fourth, it is inconceivable that a sophisticated mortgage 
banking company such as Miller & Viele would not have paid property 
taxes on the NW~NE~ from 1928 to 1946 or investigated the reasons 
for not having been assessed if they really thought they owned 
the property. There swells in the breast a certain indignation 
at the injustice that Miller & Viele might now be allowed to reap 
the benefits of the land when it was Dye's predecessors in interest 
who paid all property taxes levied and assessed upon the land 
since 1927, and who have actually possessed, improved, and 
maintained the NW~NE~ since 1940. 
Finally, Chevron participated in neither the motions for 
summary judgment, nor the appeal. Surely a lessee who thought 
it held a title defensible in light of the tax sale or who thought 
e it was in actual possession of the undivided mineral interest in 
the subject lands so as to prevent application of the statutes of 
t,limitation would have aggressively asserted its position. 
·~ 
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The present facts present a particularly appropriate case 
for application of the statutes of limitations for tax titles. 
Nearly forty six years have lapsed since creation of the tax 
title by Auditor's Tax Deed to Duchesne County dated May 9, 193: 
now held by plaintiff Richard Gerald Dye as to the surf ace and 
the undivided mineral interest now in dispute. Miller & Viele 
admits that it was never in actual possession of the NW~NE~, 
which would include the undivided one-half mineral interest. 
Moreover, the facts demonstrate and the applicable statutes and 
case law support the conclusion that Chevron Oil Company, as 
Miller & Viele's lessee, was not in actual possession of the 
undivided mineral interest in and underlying the lands. 
Further, Miller & Viele never paid the general property ta1 
levied and assessed against the lands. Since Duchesne County 
received the tax deed more than four years prior to this action, 
since Miller & Viele has failed to meet the possession requirernt 
of §§78-12-5.1 and .2, Miller & Viele's defense to plaintiff DyE 
assertion of ownership to any interest stemming from the Audi to: 
Tax Deed including the undivided one-half mineral interest is 
barred, and the title to the undivided one-half mineral interes'. 
in dispute should be quieted in plaintiff Dye and its oil and ~ 
lessee, Gas Producing Enterprises, Inc. 
Plaintiffs remind the court, that as stated in the defini~ 
section, §78-12-5.3, the validity of the tax title is not an is: 
in any determination of whether or not a party is barred by the 
of limitation from attacking or challenging a tax title. Valid 
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of the tax title becomes an issue only where the Court determines 
that Miller & Viele, by and through its lessee, Chevron Oil Company, 
was in actual possession of the disputed undivided one-half 
mineral interest in place in the NW~NE~. Such is the mandate 
of the Utah Legislature as codified in those statutes. 
POINT II 
UNDER THE 1946 QUITCLAIM DEED ARTHUR L. YOUNG ACQUIRED ONLY THE 
INTERESTS, IF ANY, OF MILLER & VIELE. WHERE MILLER & VIELE HAD 
NO INTEREST TO CONVEY, THE RESERVATION OF THE UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF 
MINERAL INTEREST WAS A NULLITY, AND SOLICITATION, DELIVERY AND 
RECORDATION OF THE QUITCLAIM DEED BY ARTHUR L. YOUNG DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE ACQUIESCENCE IN THE RESERVATION. 
In Point Two of its argwnent, Miller & Viele appears to 
assert that in spite of the statutes of limitation for tax titles, 
Dye's predecessor, Arthur L. Young, acquiesced in Miller & Viele's 
ownership and right to the undivided one-half mineral interest 
reserved to Miller & Viele in its quitclaim of the NW~NE~ to 
Arthur L. Young in 1946 (R-233). At the time the deed was executed, 
Arthur L. Young was record owner of the entire fee in the NW~NE~ 
under the tax title. 
The docwnent in which Miller & Viele purported to reserve 
an undivided one-half mineral interest in the NW~NE~ is denominated 
"QUIT-CLAIM DEED (SPECIAL)" (R-337). The words of grant read as 
follows: 
That the said party of the first part [Miller & Viele] 
... does he=eby Quit-claim unto the said party of the 
second part [Arthur L. Young] . . . (emphasis added) 
The deed, strangely enough, contains words of warranty. It is 
obvious that a standard form "Warranty Deed (Special)" was used 
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from which the words "warranty" were struck from the title of ~ 
document and words of grant. The words "Quit-Claim" were inter· 
linated in both the title and words of grant, demonstrating tha: 
both parties desire that the instrument evidence a quitclaim of 
the NWl.;iNEJ..i. 
The law of this state is that a quitclaim does not imply 
the conveyance of any particular interest in the property, as 
the grantee can only acquire the interest, if any, of his grantc 
Wallace v. Build Inc., 16 Utah 2d 401, 402 P. 2d 699, 701 (1965). 
Miller & Viele's predecessors in interest had been statatorily 
disseized by the tax sale, and therefore had no interest to corn 
to Arthur L. Young. Since a reservation retains in the granter 
a portion of what is conveyed, Miller & Viele retained or reser. 
nothing, since it had nothing to grant. No cotenancy was or cm 
have been created. 
The quitclaim deed, though solicited by Arthur L. Young, 
was obviously requested to clear the paper title on the records 
of the Duchesne County Recorder, a customary procedure among lar 
and title men. No more can be read into the solicitation, del~ 
and recording of the quitclaim deed than this. The very fact 
that Miller & Viele purported to reserve an interest it did not 
own does not demonstrate acquiescense on the part of Young. 
Young merely took what curative document Miller & Viele would g: 
realizing that the reservation was meaningless since Miller & V: 
owned no interest in the NW~NEJ..i. 
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Consequently, there was no acquiescense or agreement between 
Miller & Viele and Dye's predecessor in interest which is binding 
on Dye. The district court rejected the argument as having no 
merit, and rightly so. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Miller & Viele has failed to show actual possession 
of the NW~NE~ or the underlying undivided one-half mineral interest 
within the four year period prior to interposition of its defense 
in 1976. The very best arguments defendant offered are (1) that 
it was in constructive possession of the undivided one-half 
mineral interest "in place" in the NW~NE~ under force of the 
voluntary Communitization Agreement, or (2) that it actually 
possessed the detached oil and gas at the well-head in the SE~. 
Constructive possession does not qualify Miller & Viele for the 
actual possession exception of the statutes of limitation to 
prevent the barring of Miller & Viele's defense. Under the 
compelling case law, possession of oil and gas at the well-head 
which has been drained from adjacent unitized lands is not actual 
possession of the oil and gas or mineral interest in the adjacent 
lands. Since Miller & Viele does not qualify for the other limited 
exception and since it did not challenge the tax title within four 
years of its creation in 1932, Miller & Viele is barred from 
asserting its claim to the disputed undivided one-half mineral 
interest at this late date. The decision of the district court 
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quieting title to the undivided one-half mineral interest in 
plaintiffs Richard Gerald Dye and Gas Producing Enterprises, 
his lessee, should be affirmed. 
As to the acquiescence argument, the issue was fully brie 
and argued in the district court. That court decided that the 
argument had no merit. Miller & Viele has had its day in cour 
on this issue, and it lost. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of March 1978. 
PRUITT & GUSHEE 
By~~iBL 
torneys for Pla.j(ntiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I hand-delivered two true and correct copi 
of the foregoing Brief to Macoy A. McMurray and Robert T. Dale 
attorneys for defendant at their offices at 800 Beneficial Lif 
Tower, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 1st day of March, 1970 
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FROM RECORD ON APPEAL IN 
PAN AMERICAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. CANDELARIA 
102-105 
Filed October 28, 1966 
104 
* * * * * 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court 
' The Court makes and adopts the following findings of 
fact and conclusions of law: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of the parties hereto 
and the subject matter hereof. 
2. The following described land, the subject of this 
action, is situated in the County of Rio Arriba, State of New 
Mexico, to wit: 
All of the following described tract of land lying 
east of the San Juan River in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, 
said part containing 116.28 acres, more or less. 
Township 30 North, Range 7 West, NMPM, Rio Arriba 
County, New Mexico described as: 
The S/2 SE/4, NW/4 SE/4 of Section 18 and the NE/4 
NE/4 of Section 19 according to plat of survey filed with the 
Surveyor General's Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on November 
4, 1882; 
and described as Tract 45 in Sections 17, 18, 19 and 
20 according to plat of independent resurvey filed with the 
Surveyor General's Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on July 19, 
1915. 
105 
3. Th€ lands were originally patented by the United 
States of America to Juan B. Velasquez on March 3, 1909. 
59 
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Subsequent to the issuance of the Patent, the said Juan B. i 
Velasquez joined by his wife, Maria Albina Lucero deVelasquez,. 
conveyed the lands to Bidal A. Candelaria by Warranty Deed 
dated January 3, 1914. This deed recites the lands to be by . 
the San Juan River in San Juan County and was filed for recorc, 
in San Juan County on Jam1ary 12, 1914. Neither the Patent · 
nor Warranty Deed were filed for record in Rio Arriba County 
until the year 1962. 
4. Bidal A. Candelaria acquired title to the above 
described lands on January 3, 1914, and retained title to 
these lands until his death. 
5. Bidal A. Candelaria died on April 24, 1926, at 
Carbon Junction, Colorado, and at the ti.me of his death, he 
resided in Ignacio, Colorado. 
6. The District Court of Rio Arriba County, New 
Mexico has entered an Order determining the heirship of Bidal 
A. Candelaria, deceased, in Cause No. 295, from which it 
appears that the estate of Bidal A. Candelaria, deceased, is 
now owned as follows: 
Name 
Manuelita Candelaria 
Delubina Candelaria Salazar 
Marie Candelaria Moreno 
Bennie Candelaria Martinez 
Genevieve Candelaria 
Juanita Candelaria Mowbray 
Aurora Candelaria Marquez 
Mary Q. Candelaria 
Frank Candelaria 
Anna Marie Candelaria, also known as 
Sister Mary Corona 
Augustina Candelaria Baumer 
Marie Elena Candelaria Byron 
Dolores Candelaria Romero 
106 
Interest 
12 .5% 
12 .5'7. 
12 .57. 
12.5% 
12.5% 
12 .s1. 
12.5% 
3.1257. 
1.8757. 
1.8751'. 
1 .87 SI. 
1.8751'. 
1.8751'. 
Dolores Candelaria Romero is a minor at this time but proper~ 
represented herein by her mother and guardian, Mary O. Canciel· 
aria. 
60 
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7. All of the lands were rendered for taxes in San 
iuan County for the years 1913, 1914 and 1919 through 1939. 
~,·axes were assessed against B. A. Candelaria in San Juan County 
'or the year 1913, sold by Tax Sale Certificate No. 426 and 
·edeemed by B. A. Candelaria on January 2, 1915. By Tax Deed 
rc:ated I-larch 30, 1937, the lands were conveyed by the San Juan 
:aunty Treasurer to the State of New Mexico, and on December 
.4, 1944, the lands were thereafter conveyed by the New Mexico 
:rate Tax Commission to Saul A. Yager. These two deeds recite 
.he lands to be in San Juan County and were timely filed for 
·ecoid in San Juan County. Saul A. Yager rendered the lands 
~r taxes, and paid taxes, in San Juan County for the years 
.945 through 1959, at which time the surface was condemned by 
he Federal Government. After 1959, no taxes were assessed by 
:an Juan County. No part of the lands were rendered for taxes 
.n Rio Arriba County until the year 1962. 
8. In 1947 Saul A. Yager filed a quiet title suit in 
he District Court of San Juan County in Cause No. 02439 
1 escribing the lands involved herein as being located in San 
~an County. B. A. Candelaria had been deceased since 1926 
nd was named as a living person in said quiet title suit. 
he record in Cause No. 02439 shows that Bidal A. Candelaria 
as not personally served with process, and none of the plain-
iffs in this action was personally served with process. 
otice of lis pendens in said Cause No. 02439 was not filed in 
.io Arriba County. 
107 
9. In 1948 Saul A. Yager exeucted two oil and gas 
eases to Wayne Moore purporting to lease the minerals under-
ying the lands involved herein and describing the lands as 
eing located in San Juan County. The defendants are succes-
ors in interest to Wayne l-!oore. 
10. The defendants included the lands involved herein 
n the Unit Agree~ent and Unit Operating Agreement for the 
evelopment and operation of the Northeast Blanco Unit Area. 
11. In 1953 Blackwood & Nichols Company, operator of 
he ~ortheast Blanco Unit, obtained a compulsory pooling order 
lyrom the New ~!exico Oil Conservation Corrmission pooling the 
l · 
61 
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properties in the E/2 of Section 18, E/2 of Section 19, W/2 t 
Section 17 and W/2 of Section 20 into four separate drilli~f 
and proration units. 'd 
t 
12. Wells were ccmmenced and completed by the defert 
ants on the dates and for the costs hereinafter set forth: e 
r 
Well 
12-18 
13-20 
35-19 
24-17 
Dates of Well Commence-
ment and Completion 
8/29/53 - 10/16/53 
8/31/53 - 12/17/53 
7/14/57- 7/25/57 
5/1/55 - 5/22/55 
Cost 
d 
$90, 681. 35 (Mesa Ver 
Formation) 
$114,785.86 (Dakotai.J 
Formation) t: 
$16 5 , 5 6 9 . 2 0 (Me s a V1 1, 
Formation) Ci 
$87, 865. 7 5 (Mesa Ve:~~ 
Formation) 
$64,502 .00 (Mesa Ve:ir 
Form2tion) ME 
Sl 
The Dakota Formation in the 12-18 Well was dry. 
13. Acreage was dedicated to the wells by the def~ 
ants for the purpose of receiving an allowable as hereinaf:tr 
set forth: 
ef 
Well 
12-18 
13-20 
35-19 
24-17 
108 
Acreage Dedicated 
E/2 
W/2 
E/2 
S/2 
Section 18 
Sect ion 
Section 
Section 
20 
19 
17 
ir 
at 
be 
th 
. HI 
:ti 
?l 
je 
14. A portion of the lands involved herein •..;as decn 
cated to each of the four wells and the total acreage dedic:lp 
ed to the four wells included all of the lands involved he~ 
None of the wells were physically located on the land invol 
in this action. 
15. The defendants have rece:'..ved an allowable fror: 
62 
( 6) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
107-109 
the ~lew Mexico Oil Conservation Commission for each of the 
four wells based upon the acreage dedicated to each well. The 
defendants' allowable has been proportionately increased by 
their dedication to each well of the plaintiffs' acreage. If 
.they had not been able todedicate the plaintiffs' acreage to 
each well their allowable would have been proportionately 
reduced. 
16. The four wells drilled by the defendants have 
drained gas and other minerals from the lands involved herein. 
17. The plaintiffs were not aware of the wells here 
involved, or that they owned the lands involved or of any of 
the proceedings relative to the quiet title suit, oil and gas 
1.leases, unitization or actions before the New Mexico Oil 
'conservation Commission. The plaintiffs did not discover 
,,that they could assert any of the claims asserted herein until 
·'they were joined as parties defendant in Civil Action No. 3934 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
~ 1Mexico by the United States Government for condemnation of the 
surface of the lands involved herein. 
109 
er 
1, 18. The defendants acted in good faith in drilling 
the wells in question and in their unitization efforts and 
efforts before the Oil Conservation Commission. Their action 
in using the plaintiffs' lands to obtain an increased allow-
able and increased production was in good faith and in the 
belief that they had the right to do so. 
19. The defendants hive been unjustly enriched and 
the plaintiffs have been damaged by the defendants in the 
·1mount of the full value of all production attributable to 
:he lands involved herein, based upon the percentage of the 
?laintiffs' acreage dedicated to each of the four well's · The 
.Jefendants are entitled to deductions for the plaintiffs' 
~ noportionate share of expenditures made in development and 
lC'iperation of the wells. 
er· 
Jl Conclusions of Law 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
63 
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the subject matter of this cause. 
2. The plaintiffs are the owners of the minerals 
underlying the lands involved herein and are entitled to a 
decree quieting their title against the adverse claims of 
the defendants. 
3. The defendants have been unjustly enriched to 
detriment of the plaintiffs. The defendants should, then 
account to the plaintiffs for the plaintiffs' share of all 
production from the four wells to be determined by the a~ 
of plaintiffs' acreage dedicated to each well, plus intere. 
on said production from the date of production at the rate 
6 percent per annum. In accounting to the plaintiffs the 
defendants should be allowed to deduct from the 
110 
amount due the plaintiffs the plaintiffs' share of the co: 
development and operating costs to be determined by the u 
of plaintiffs' acreage dedicated to each well, plus inten 
on said sums from the date of expenditure at the rate of! 
percent per annum, but should not be allowed to deduct the 
cost of drilling the 12-18 well to the Dakota formation. 
4. The defendants have converted the plaintiffs' 
minerals to the defendants' use. 
5. The plaintiff's right to recovery in this act. 
is not barred by the doctrine of laches, the applicable~ 
Mexico statute of limitations, or the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
6. The quiet title decree on which the defendant 
rely is void as to these lands and as against these defe~ 
ants. 
7. The plaintiffs should have judgment against 
defendants for the costs of this action. 
All Requested Findings and Conclusions not inco~ 
ated in the above are refused. 
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Dated at Albuquerque, New Mexico, on this the 28th day 
of October, 1966. 
Howard Bratton 
United States District Judge 
Filed October 28, 1966 
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